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Are humans intuitively altruistic, or does altruism require self-control? A theory of social heuristics,
whereby intuitive responses favor typically successful behaviors, suggests that the answer may depend
on who you are. In particular, evidence suggests that women are expected to behave altruistically, and
are punished for failing to be altruistic, to a much greater extent than men. Thus, women (but not men)
may internalize altruism as their intuitive response. Indeed, a meta-analysis of 13 new experiments and
9 experiments from other groups found that promoting intuition relative to deliberation increased giving
in a Dictator Game among women, but not among men (Study 1, N  4,366). Furthermore, this effect
was shown to be moderated by explicit sex role identification (Study 2, N  1,831): the more women
described themselves using traditionally masculine attributes (e.g., dominance, independence) relative to
traditionally feminine attributes (e.g., warmth, tenderness), the more deliberation reduced their altruism.
Our findings shed light on the connection between gender and altruism, and highlight the importance of
social heuristics in human prosociality.
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Humans often choose to help others. Yet such prosociality
typically requires us to expend time, effort, and money. What
makes us willing to do so? Recently, there has been considerable
interest in exploring human prosociality using a dual process
perspective (for a review, see Zaki & Mitchell, 2013), where
decisions are conceptualized as resulting from competition be-
tween cognitive processes that are automatic, fast, and intuitive,
versus those that are controlled, slow, and deliberative (Kahneman,
2003; Sloman, 1996). Does prosociality require deliberative self-
control, or do prosocial impulses get reined in by the calculus of
self-interest?
The Social Heuristics Hypothesis (SHH) has been proposed as a
theoretical framework for answering this question (Peysakhovich
& Rand, 2015; Rand et al., 2014). The SHH adds an explicitly dual
process lens to theories regarding the adoption of typically advan-
tageous behaviors (e.g., theories based on “spillover” effects [Ki-
yonari, Tanida, & Yamagishi, 2000], norm internalization [Chudek
& Henrich, 2011], and consequences of interdependence in one’s
social interaction experiences [Van Lange, De Bruin, Otten, &
Joireman, 1997]). The SHH posits that the social strategies which
are typically successful in daily life become automatized specifi-
cally as intuitive responses. Deliberation can then override these
intuitions and adjust one’s behavior in light of the details of the
specific decision at hand.
In particular, the SHH argues that a key component of deliber-
ation is the consideration of strategic concerns and payoff maxi-
mization, which favors self-interested behavior. As a result, delib-
eration is predicted to sometimes undermine prosocial intuitions,
but not to push selfish intuitions toward prosociality. A mathemat-
ical model of dual-process agents playing Prisoner’s Dilemma
games formalizes this prediction (Bear & Rand, 2016): among all
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possible strategies, the dual-process strategies that perform best
(and thus are favored by evolution, social learning, and/or strategic
decision-making) use deliberation to switch from cooperation to
defection in one-shot anonymous settings. Conversely, strategies
that use deliberation to switch from defection to cooperation
(under any circumstances) never perform well, and are always
disfavored.
By this account, where typically successful strategies are intu-
itive, intuition should favor cooperation for most people: in the
context of daily life, most important interactions (e.g., with co-
workers, friends, and family) are repeated. Thus, because cooper-
ation is non-zero-sum, cooperating can be in one’s long-run self-
interest: cooperating with others today can induce others to
cooperate with you in the future (Rand & Nowak, 2013). Con-
versely, when interacting in settings where future consequences
are not enough to incentivize cooperation (e.g., one-shot anony-
mous laboratory experiments), it is never in one’s self-interest to
cooperate; and, therefore, deliberation should favor selfishness. As
predicted by this account, experimentally promoting intuition rel-
ative to deliberation via time pressure or a conceptual priming
exercise has been found to increase cooperation on average in
one-shot anonymous interactions (Cone & Rand, 2014; Lotz,
2015; Protzko, Ouimette, & Schooler, 2015; Rand, Greene, &
Nowak, 2012; Rand, Newman, & Wurzbacher, 2015); for a meta-
analysis, see Rand et al. (2014).
The implications of the SHH for altruism (unilaterally giving
resources to others), however, remain unclear. On the one hand, a
narrow read of the SHH suggests that, like deliberation, intuition
should disfavor altruism: transferring money to someone and then
having them transfer it back does not make one better off than just
keeping the original money, and so altruism (unlike cooperation) is
not advantageous even in repeated games. On the other hand, a
broader interpretation of the SHH suggests that intuition may favor
altruism in a similar way to what has been observed with cooper-
ation. If being selfish in the context of zero-sum interactions is
seen negatively by others, it may create reputational costs in the
context of other (non-zero-sum) interactions. If so, then altruism
could be payoff maximizing in the long run. However, it may not
be the case that all people are harmed from being seen as selfish,
such that moderators may exist for whether altruism is advanta-
geous in daily life (and thus favored by intuition).
A particularly compelling candidate for such moderation is
gender. Specifically, we might expect women, but not men, to
have altruism as their intuitive social response for two reasons.
First, a large body of work suggests that the behavior of men and
women is governed by stereotypes concerning their social roles;
and in particular that women are expected to be communal and
unselfish, whereas men are expected to be agentic and independent
(Eagly, 1987). When women behave in ways that are perceived as
insufficiently communal, they are not only liked less, but they are
also less likely to be helped, hired, promoted, paid fairly, and given
status, power, and independence in their jobs (Heilman &
Okimoto, 2007). Thus, women are subject to much stronger ex-
pectations that they will behave altruistically (Heilman & Chen,
2005). Furthermore, recent work has found that women are well
aware of these gender stereotype-based behavioral prescriptions,
and their concern over encountering backlash effects from violat-
ing these stereotypes helps explain, in part, a range of behaviors
that systematically vary by gender (Brescoll, 2011). As a result,
behaving altruistically in accordance with others’ expectations is
typically advantageous for women.
Second, the fact that women disproportionately occupy roles
that either mandate self-sacrificing and altruistic behavior (e.g.,
mother) or, at the very least, require a great deal of other-oriented,
communal behavior (e.g., nurse; Eagly, 1987), may cause women
to habituate to being altruistic. And even women who do not
explicitly occupy such family or work roles may acquire altruistic
intuitive social responses because female peer groups are markedly
more communal and egalitarian than male peer groups, and thus
make self-sacrificing, unselfish behavior socially adaptive (Mac-
coby, 1998). Taken together, consideration of both the expecta-
tions of others and the behaviors one engages in regularly point to
intuition favoring altruism for women more so than men.
In this paper, we experimentally investigated the role of intu-
ition and deliberation in altruism, and the potential moderating role
of gender. In Study 1, a meta-analysis of 22 giving studies where
cognitive processing was manipulated revealed the predicted in-
teraction between cognitive processing mode and gender: promot-
ing intuition increased altruism in women but had no significant
effect in men. Study 2 then investigated the mechanism behind this
effect by examining whether identification with gender norms
moderated the sex differences found in Study 1.
Study 1
Method
In Study 1, we conducted a meta-analysis (N  4,366) of new
and existing studies looking at the effects of experimentally ma-
nipulating the use of intuition versus deliberation on giving in the
Dictator Game (DG). In the DG, participants unilaterally decide
how to divide actual money between themselves and an anony-
mous recipient. Across studies, we used the percentage of the
endowment given to the recipient as our measure of altruism.
To minimize file-drawer effects, we began by including all data
each of the authors of the present study had ever collected where
cognitive processing was manipulated in a zero-sum dictator game
(including failed pilots, experiments with problematic design fea-
tures, etc.). We had 13 such experiments (all previously unpub-
lished), each of which manipulated cognitive processing using
either time constraints or conceptual priming. To avoid selection
effects, we included participants who disobeyed the time con-
straints.
Reducing the amount of time subjects have to decide shortens
the window of opportunity for deliberation to rein in intuition,
leading to more intuitive decisions (Wright, 1974). Therefore, in
the time constraint experiments, reliance on intuition was in-
creased by asking subjects to make their giving decision in less
than a specified number of seconds (time pressure) and was
reduced by asking subjects to wait and think for at least a specified
number of seconds before deciding (time delay). The conceptual
priming conditions, on the other hand, used a writing exercise at
the outset of the experiment to induce more or less intuitive
decision making (Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2012). Reliance on
intuition was increased by asking subjects to write about a time in
their life where following their intuition worked out well, or where
carefully reasoning through a problem worked out poorly. Reli-
ance on intuition was decreased by asking subjects to write about
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a time in their life where following their intuition worked out
poorly, or where carefully reasoning through a problem worked
out well.
We also included data from other labs by doing a comprehen-
sive database search and requesting raw data (including gender)
for experiments in which cognitive processing was manipulated in
dictator games with the standard setup of (a) a single anonymous
recipient, and (b) a decision space ranging from completely selfish
to completely altruistic. For cognitive process manipulations, in
addition to time pressure and conceptual priming, we also included
experiments that used cognitive load (where participants had to
engage in a more or less cognitively demanding task, such as
holding a 7-digit vs. 3-digit number in working memory, while
completing the DG).1
In total, we received data sets for nine additional experiments
(Benjamin, Brown, & Shapiro, 2013; Cornelissen, Dewitte, & War-
lop, 2011; Evans, 2014; Hauge, Brekke, Johansson, Johansson-
Stenman, & Svedsäter, 2014; Kinnunen & Windmann, 2013). Thus,
Study 1 aggregated data from 22 experiments, for a total of 4,366
participants (52.7% female, Mage  29.8). (Please see online supple-
mental material Table S1, which provides details for each experi-
ment).
Results and Discussion
As predicted, random-effects meta-analysis of DG giving found
a significant interaction between gender and cognitive processing
mode, effect size 5.5 percentage points, 95% CI [2.6, 8.5], Z 
3.66, p  .0001 (see Figure 1). There was no evidence of publi-
cation bias (Egger’s test, t.28, p .79; Begg’s test, z.31,
p  .76), or of heterogeneity in the true size of this interaction
across studies, chi2(21)  16.04, p  .77. Furthermore, metare-
gression found no significant difference in interaction effect be-
tween studies run online versus in the physical laboratory, t  .22,
p  .83 (interaction effect: 6.1 percentage points in lab, 5.4
percentage points online); and no significant differences in inter-
action effect size across methods of manipulating cognitive pro-
cessing, F(2, 19)  .4, p  .68 (interaction effect: cognitive load,
6.4 percentage points; conceptual priming, 6.1 percentage points
with; time constraints, 2.7 percentage points).
Examining simple effects showed a significant positive effect of
promoting intuition among women (see Figure 2), effect size 3.8
percentage points, 95% CI [1.9, 5.7], Z  3.87, p  .0001;
resulting in on average 10.8% more giving in the high intuition
condition relative to the low intuition condition. Conversely, there
was no significant effect among men (see Figure 3), effect
size 2.0 percentage points, 95% CI [4.2, .001], Z  1.87, p 
.062. Again, there was no evidence of heterogeneity in effect size
across studies (women, chi2(21)  13.1, p  .91; men, chi2(21) 
16.4, p  .75).
Study 2
Study 1 showed an interaction between gender and cognitive
processing mode: intuition favored unilaterally helping others for
women, but not for men. Although this effect was consistent with
our predictions based on the SHH and the differential daily-life
value of altruism for women versus men, the goal of Study 2 was
to provide more direct evidence for social norms as the proposed
mechanism. Specifically, if sex differences in the relationship
between intuition, deliberation, and altruism are driven by social
norms associated with men and women’s social roles, then indi-
vidual differences in the extent to which people adopt such sex role
norms should moderate this relationship. In particular, for women,
explicit self-identification with traditionally masculine attributes
was predicted to influence deliberative responses but not intuitive
responses.
Women who identify with masculine attributes are still per-
ceived by the world as women, and thus are subject to the altruistic
expectations placed upon women (making altruism typically ad-
vantageous for them). Since intuitive responses are not within
one’s conscious control, but instead implement typically advanta-
geous behaviors, the intuitive responses of even women who
explicitly adopt masculine attributes should be as altruistic as
women who explicitly identify with feminine attributes; and wom-
en’s intuitive responses should be more altruistic than men’s,
regardless of whether women identify more with masculine versus
feminine attributes.
When deliberating, however, explicit gender role identification was
predicted to influence women’s altruism: women who identified more
with masculine attributes were predicted to shift in the direction of
men (i.e., to become less altruistic), because altruism is disfavored by
both (a) masculine gender roles (which involve power, dominance,
and independent self-interest) and (b) deliberation’s general tendency
to make people consider strategic self-interest.
Women who explicitly identify with feminine attributes, on the
other hand, deliberatively embrace traits that are consistent with
altruism, and are in conflict with the self-interested effects of
strategic deliberation. Thus, deliberation should not affect their
behavior in the DG. For the same reason, men who explicitly
identify with feminine attributes should also not override their
selfish intuitions to become more altruistic when deliberating.
Finally, for men who identify with masculine attributes, their
intuitive and deliberative responses are in alignment, both favoring
relative selfishness, which again leads to no predicted effect of
deliberating. Study 2 directly tested these hypotheses.
Study 2 also explored a second potential moderator, how
strongly participants felt that gender norms were enforced in their
lives, which was unsuccessful for reasons that we believe were
practical, rather than theoretically informative, in nature (see on-
line supplemental material section 2 for details).
Method
Study 2 took advantage of the fact that three of our experiments
from Study 1 (K, L, and M), in which participants completed the
conceptual priming manipulation described in Study 1 and made a
single dictator game decision (total N  1,831; 51.5% female,
Mage  35.0 years), also included questions about self-
identification with male and female sex roles (the short-form of the
1 We did not include ego depletion, based both on evidence that ego
depletion may not function in the same way as other cognitive process
manipulations (Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012), and the fact that we were
only able to obtain data from one depletion study with a total of 54
participants (Halali, Bereby-Meyer, & Ockenfels, 2013); including these
data does not qualitatively alter our key results.
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391INTUITION FAVORS ALTRUISM FOR WOMEN BUT NOT FOR MEN
Bem Sex-Role Inventory [BSRI; Bem, 1977]).2 Participants indi-
cated the extent to which each of 20 attributes (10 traditionally
masculine, 10 traditionally feminine) described them (from 1 
never or almost never true to 7  always or almost always true).3
We then classified participants’ gender role identification as mas-
culine versus feminine using a median split on the sum of all
masculine items minus the sum of all feminine items (Hoffman &
Borders, 2001).
Results and Discussion
Study 2 reproduced the pattern observed in the meta-analysis: an
analysis of variance (ANOVA) predicting DG giving based on cog-
nitive processing mode, gender, and study demonstrated an interac-
tion between cognitive processing mode and gender, F(1, 1819) 
3.85, p  .050, effect size 4.4 percentage points, such that dictator
giving was significantly greater among women when intuition was
promoted (M  .40, SD  .23) relative to deliberation (M  .37,
SD  .24), t(941)  2.08, p  .038; but cognitive process did not
significantly affect giving among men (intuition: M .32, SD .27;
deliberation: M  .33, SD  .27), t(886)  .58, p  .55. No other
terms were significant (p  .15 for all), except for a significant main
effect of gender, F(1, 1819)  29.5, p  .001, effect size 6.3
percentage points, such that women (M  .39, SD  .24) gave more
than men (M  .33, SD  .27). In particular, because the three-way
interaction between gender, cognitive processing mode, and study
was not significant, F(2, 1819)  .46, p  .63, we collapsed across
study in our subsequent analyses.
To test for moderation, we conducted an ANOVA predicting DG
giving using gender, cognitive processing mode, and sex role self-
identification (0  feminine, 1  masculine).4 In addition to signif-
icant main effects of gender F(1, 1823) 18.53, p .0001, such that
women were more altruistic than men, and sex role self-identification,
F(1, 1823)  13.57, p  .0002, such that feminine participants were
more altruistic than masculine participants, we observed the predicted
significant three-way interaction between gender, cognitive process-
2 The order (i.e. whether the moderator questions came before or after
the conceptual priming task and DG) was randomized. Our analyses
collapsed over order, rather than analyzing the effect of order, because a
substantial difference in attrition rates between the orders prevented valid
causal inference about order effects.
3 Traditionally masculine attributes: willing to take a stand; defends own
beliefs; independent; has leadership abilities; strong personality; forceful;
dominant; aggressive; assertive; willing to take risks. Traditionally femi-
nine attributes: affectionate; warm; compassionate; gentle; tender; sympa-
thetic; sensitive to needs of others; soothe hurt feelings; understanding;
loves children.
4 Our results are qualitatively equivalent when using a continuous mea-
sure of sex role self-identification, but for ease of calculating and display-
ing simple effects of cognitive processing mode, we used the median split.
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Figure 1. Effect size (ES) for interaction between gender and cognitive processing mode for each experiment
in Study 1. See online supplemental materials Table S1 for key. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals
(CI). Gray squares indicate weight placed on each study by random-effects meta-analysis.
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ing mode, and sex role self-identification, F(1, 1823)  5.23, p 
.022, effect size 11.1 percentage points.5 This three-way interaction
was such that there was a significant two-way interaction between
cognitive processing mode and self-identification among women,
F(1, 939) 5.52, p .019, effect size 7.4 percentage points, but not
among men, F(1, 884)  1.00, p  .32, effect size 3.8 percentage
points. Decomposing the significant two-way interaction among
women, we found a significant negative effect of promoting deliber-
ation for women who self-identified as masculine, t(371) 3.19, p
.002, effect size 7.8 percentage points, and no significant effect of
promoting deliberation for women who self-identified as feminine,
t(570)  .19, p  .85, effect size .00 percentage points. As can be
seen in Figure 4, men gave a comparatively smaller amount regardless
of cognitive processing mode or identification with masculine versus
feminine attributes, whereas women gave a larger amount unless they
both identified as masculine and were induced to deliberate. We also
note that these results were not driven entirely by the feminine sex
role items, many of which were directly related to prosociality/
altruism: a median split on just the 10 masculine items also reveals a
significant negative effect of deliberation among more masculine
women, t(429)  2.35, p  .019, effect size 5.4 percentage points,
and no significant effect of deliberation among less masculine
women, t(514)  .67, p  .50, effect size 1.4 percentage points.
Thus, Study 2 found that although intuition favored altruism
among women, those women who explicitly saw themselves as
occupying traditionally masculine sex roles became more selfish
when deliberating. Conversely, men’s comparatively selfish intu-
itive response was unaffected by deliberation.
General Discussion
What roles do intuition and deliberation play in altruism? Here
we have explored this question using economic games and found
that the answer depends on who you are. Study 1 meta-analyzed 22
DG studies and revealed an interaction whereby promoting intu-
ition relative to deliberation made women significantly more likely
to give, but had no significant effect on giving among men. Study
2 then demonstrated moderation by sex role identification, such
that deliberation specifically undermined the altruistic intuitions of
women who saw themselves as masculine.
Our results tie together two distinct lines of theory: one regard-
ing gender differences in altruism, and another regarding social
heuristics and the basis of intuition. Women disproportionately
occupy social roles that require communal and even self-
sacrificing behavior: thus, failing to behave communally results in
negative consequences for women more so than men. The SHH
5 Note that this result is robust to Bonferroni correcting for also having
tested a second moderator (described in the supplemental materials), given
that p  .025.
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therefore predicts that men and women would develop different
intuitions regarding altruism. And indeed, this is what our data
show. Our results therefore support a core tenant of the SHH—that
intuitive responses implement social behaviors that are typically
advantageous.
In contrast to the current work on altruism, the SHH predicts
that cooperation will be intuitive regardless of one’s gender:
cooperating inherently has the possibility to be long-run payoff-
maximizing because it is non-zero-sum, and thus does not rely on
expectations related to social roles. Consistent with this prediction,
a follow-up paper inspired by the current studies found no gender
moderation of the relationship between intuition and cooperation,
which was positive for both women and men (Rand, 2016).
The fact that deliberation only works against altruism in our
data, rather than sometimes making men more altruistic by over-
riding their selfish intuitions, is also consistent with the SHH. The
SHH posits that a key component of deliberation is the consider-
ation of what choice is payoff maximizing, which is always self-
ishness in our experiments (because they involve one-shot anon-
ymous interactions)—and such payoff-maximizing considerations
work against any deliberative motivations to give (such as having
a conscious desire to be communal).
Although we explicitly rely on social norms in our theorizing
about the gender difference in intuitive altruism, the ultimate
origins of the distribution of men and women into different social
roles could be biological in nature (Preston, 2013). Specifically,
women’s capacity for reproduction and men’s greater physical size
and strength (Wood & Eagly, 2002) along with the evolutionary
advantages to women of occupying roles that require a longer-term
investment in caring for offspring (Buss, 1995) may explain why
women end up occupying roles that require communal and self-
sacrificing behavior in the first place and thus why altruism may
become the intuitive social response for women.
Overall
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The size of the effects we observed was determined not only by the
actual magnitude of the influence that intuition and deliberation have on
altruism, but also by the effectiveness of the cognitive processing manip-
ulations used. These manipulations were at best only partially successful
in making participants rely more heavily on intuition versus deliber-
ation—those in the “intuition-promoting” conditions were un-
doubtedly still able to engage in substantial degrees of delibera-
tion, despite the experimental manipulation. As a result, our
overall estimates of the observed effects are likely underestimates
of the effect size of intuitive processing on altruism one might
observe with more powerful manipulations, or in more strongly
valenced real-world interactions. Thus, we argue that the size of
the observed effects is less important that their direction.
Relatedly, it is unclear the extent to which these manipulations
acted by reducing deliberation versus amplifying intuition. Thus,
future research should use different manipulations to better under-
stand the nature of participants’ baseline responses, as well as
including baseline responses (i.e., no manipulation). Furthermore,
future research should examine whether the gender differences in
intuitive altruism we observed in the context of interpersonal
giving extend to other forms of altruistic behavior, such as chari-
table giving (Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007) and “extreme”
altruism (Rand & Epstein, 2014), and to intergroup contexts (given
evidence that tribal instincts for parochial altruism are stronger in
men; Van Vugt, De Cremer, & Janssen, 2007).
In sum, we provide evidence that promoting intuition relative to
deliberation increases altruistic giving in women but not men.
These findings extend our understanding of gender and prosocial-
ity, and advance a model of intuitive decision-making based on
social heuristics.
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